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THE PROLIFERATION OF LEGAL TRUTH
JACK M. BALKIN
*
I am delighted that the Federalist Society asked me to
participate in its Symposium on Law and Truth.
1
 I suspect,
however, given my previous jurisprudential writings, that I was
invited in order to play the role of Pontius Pilate. But I refuse
that responsibility. I wash my hands of it. For I am a great
believer in legal truth. Indeed, the theme of this essay is that we
are awash in legal truth; indeed, we are drowning in it. In the
world in which we live, legal truth is proliferating at an
astounding pace, and this truth has important effects on our
lives for good and for ill. The proliferation of legal truth and the
effects of power produced by that proliferation are the subjects
of this essay.
In his remarks for this symposium, Michael Moore suggested
that I am a conventionalist when it comes to legal truth.
2
 With
respect to law, at least, he is right, although not necessarily with
respect to other matters.
3
 Law is an interpenetrating set of social
conventions, and therefore statements of law can be true by
virtue of those conventions. To be sure, these conventions may
not be fully specified or fully determinate, and their content can
change over time. In this essay, however, I focus on the
converse point, that when legal conventions are sufficiently
specified and sufficiently determinate, they can and do decide
what is true or false from the standpoint of law.
There are lots of true legal propositions; indeed, so many that
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. My
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suggestions.
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I can't even begin to list them. They are true by legal
convention, in virtue of the social practices that constitute law.
As Susan Haack puts it, they are true as legal claims.
4
 Or as
common law lawyers would put it, they are true in the eyes of
the law.
5
 In fact, one of the most interesting features of law  as a
system of social conventions is its ability to make things true or,
to put  it another way, to create legal categories that permit
characterizations of situations and practices that are true or
false. My point, however, is not simply that propositions of law
are true in virtue of legal conventions.   It is rather that law
creates truth-- it makes things true as a matter of law. It makes
things true in the eyes of the law. And when law makes things
true in its own eyes, this has important consequences in the
world.
Consider, for example, the common law distinction between
trespassers, licensees, and invitees.  Landowners have different
tort duties toward people who trespass on their property, enter
their property for business reasons, or visit as invited social
guests.  Simply by making these distinctions, the common law
makes it possible for it to be true or not true that a person is a
trespasser, licensee or invitee.
Sexual harassment law makes it illegal to engage in sexual
harassment.  At the same time, it defines a practice as
understood by law called sexual harassment.   It makes it
possible for someone to be a sexual harasser or not be a sexual
harasser in the eyes of the law.   It creates legal rights against
sexual harassment and makes it possible to protect and violate
these legal rights.  Similarly, when law creates intellectual
property rights in computer code, it makes it possible to violate
those rights, to be or not to be a copyright infringer.
When law allows companies to create 401(k) plans, or when
it provides general statutes of incorporation, it defines
4. Susan Haack, Law and Truth: Pre-Modernism, Modernism and Post-Modernism,
Address at Federalist Society Conference on Law and Truth at Yale Law School (Mar. 1-
2, 2002). See also Susan Haack, ARTICLE TITLE, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y ____
(2002).
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LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 225-231 (Peter Brooks and Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996) (emphasizing how law gains authority from its construction of
discourse).
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institutions and practices that people can bring into being.  It
makes possible true and false statements about these institutions
and practices, and about rights and responsibilities with respect
to them.
Thus, there several different ways that law can make things
true. Sometimes law makes things true just by creating
categories and distinctions that define certain situations or
conduct vis-à-vis other kinds of situations or conduct, or that
make things equivalent or different from the standpoint of legal
doctrine. Sometimes law makes things true by creating causes
of action or rights, as in sexual harassment law or intellectual
property law. And sometimes law makes things true by creating
institutions or devices, like a corporation or a Roth IRA or a
401(k) plan.  When the law does any of these things, it
simultaneously creates the possibility of things being true or
false in the eyes of the law.
So in this sense, law is continuously proliferating truth into
the world. It is making things real. It is making things true and
false. These things are not true and false from the standpoint of
mathematics or natural science. Rather, they are true and false
from the standpoint of law. But the truth that law produces is
nothing to sneeze at.  Because law is a form of power that is
backed up by and helps constitute the authority of the state,
what the law says is real, and what the law says is true or false
has important consequences in the world. Put another way,
law’s capacity to create truth and make things real is the flip
side of its power.  Law has power because it can make things
true or false in ways that matter to us; conversely, law can make
things true or false in ways that matter to us because it has
power over us.
Why is this proliferation of legal truth and legal reality
important? It is important, I think, for three reasons. First, the
proliferation of legal truth shapes, directs, and constrains how
people live their lives.  It produces incentives and disincentives
for people's conduct.   Second, the proliferation of legal truth
shapes people’s beliefs and understandings. Law has power
over people’s imaginations and how they think about what is
happening in the world. Third, the proliferation of legal truth is
important because law's truth is not the only truth, and law's
vision of reality is not the only reality.  Law's power to enforce
its vision of the world can clash with other practices of
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knowledge, and with other forms of truth.
Let me address each of these points in turn.
Law continuously creates a form of knowledge—legal
knowledge. As soon as law creates a category or an institutional
structure, it is possible for things to become true or real in the
eyes of the law whether or not they are judged true or real from
another perspective-- for example the standpoint of medical
science, religious belief, or political philosophy. So as soon as
we create a doctrine that says that money is speech, then money
is speech in the eyes of the law.
6
 It doesn’t matter whether we
know that money is not speech. The law says it is speech and
therefore it is speech in the eyes of the law.
Similarly, if the law says that a fetus is not a person, then it
does not matter that religious faith tells us that the law is wrong,
and that the law is effectively legitimizing murder. A fetus is
simply not a person in the eyes of the law.
7
 This has obvious
political ramifications, for it places the power of the state
behind a certain conception of how the world is and what is true
and false within it, whatever one's views to the contrary might
be and no matter how vociferously one expresses them.
My second point follows from the first. I have just asserted
that things can be true from the standpoint of law even if people
don't believe them to be true in other respects. But the
proliferation of legal truth is also important because law does
shape what people believe and what they understand. Law has
power over people’s imaginations and how they think about
what is happening in social life. Law in this sense is more than a
set of sanctions. It is a form of cultural software that shapes the
way we think about and apprehend the world.
8
Law adds things to reality. And it colonizes the human mind.
That is how it proliferates its power over the world. A very
familiar conception of law is Holmes’ model of law as a
sanction or a price.
9
 A rational actor faces constraints created by
6. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (“virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money”); see
also J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976).
7. See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“the word “person,” as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
8. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 5-6.
9. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458-59
(1897).
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law and has to decide how to behave given the likely legal
consequences of his or her actions.
10
 From this standpoint alone
the law is surely proliferating things into the world: it is
proliferating prices and probabilities of certain sanctions.
But I want to take Holmes’ point a step further. Law also
proliferates ways of characterizing a situation or understanding
the situation as being one sort of thing rather than another.
Sexual harassment law is a good example. Before the
development of sexual harassment law, there may or may not
have been a generally recognized social practice called sexual
harassment. People were struggling to give it a name and to
condemn it.
11
 But there was no such thing legally.   There were
only legal actions for seduction (if they had not been abolished
by statute), assault, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. After the creation of sexual harassment law, it became
possible to identify a certain set of practices as sexual
harassment from the standpoint of law.   Indeed, it also became
possible to be a sexual harasser. It became possible to
understand one's own actions  as being or not being sexual
harassment.  It became possible for employers to engage in
certain types of behavior, and to instruct employees to engage in
certain types of behavior, so as not to be guilty of sexual
harassment.
In this way law creates tools for understanding one's self,
others, and the social world in which one lives.  Those legal
understandings, in turn, can merge with and shape popular
understandings of sexual harassment is.  These popular
understandings are not necessarily the same as the technical
10. See id at 458-59. Holmes’s view of the law as a sanction or price anticipates a basic
insight of law and economics scholarship. Although in recent years lawyer economists
have also emphasized the ways that law can express social norms, they have hardly
abandoned the notion that law (or social norms for that matter) set a price on conduct. My
focus, by contrast, is how law and social norms are forms of cultural software, which
shape how one apprehends the world and understands what is socially the case.
11. See Reva B. Siegel, “ On the Basis of Sex” : A Short
History of Sexual Harassment, in Directions in Sexual
Harassment Law (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.
forthcoming 2004) (tracing history of sexual harassment doctrine); Susan Estrich,
Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 816-26 (1991) (tracing the development of sexual
harassment as a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under Title VII); see generally LIN
FARLEY, SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978)
(discussing sexual harassment as a political and social problem); CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) (advocating
recognition of sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII).
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legal definition, but are shaped and nourished by the legal
recognition of the practice; conversely, the legal practice can be
shaped and nourished by popular understandings of the legal
concept.
Indeed, the very expression—the “legal recognition” of a
cause of action— suggests the important connection between
what law sees as socially real and what it makes socially real
though its authority as law. When law “recognizes” a cause of
action for sexual harassment, for example, it sees that such a
thing exists as a legal wrong. At the moment the wrong
becomes cognizable to the law, it becomes real to the law,
whether or not it had been real to generations of individuals
before that point. In like fashion, when courts hold that software
code is “speech” under the First Amendment,
12
 they recognize
or see the code as speech, placing it in the same category or
conceptual box as other examples of speech, including giving a
commencement address, performing a sexual act in a motion
picture, distributing a pamphlet, waving (or burning) a flag, or
writing a check to a political action committee. In that moment,
all of these activities become speech in the eyes of the law,
differentiated from other things that are not speech in the eyes
of the law.
What law is doing, in short, is more than simply giving
people sanctions or prices for their conduct. What law is doing
is giving people tools to think with.  It is giving people a way of
understanding and apprehending what is the case.  Law enables
people to understand what is socially real in terms of legal
categories, in short, in terms of what is real to the law.
This way of seeing the world—through the eyes of the law—
has important ideological effects. Often people contrast truth to
ideology. If something is ideological, it can’t be true, and vice
versa. That is not my view of ideology. Ideology is cultural
software. It is a set of tools for apprehending and understanding
who you are and what is happening to you, what the world
around you is like, and so on.
13
 And those tools of
understanding have power over you because they shape your
12. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447-49 (2d Cir.
2001); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. United States
Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1139-41, reh’g granted en banc and opinion withdrawn,
192 F.3d 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1999).
13. See BALKIN, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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understanding.
14
 So it is not self-contradictory to say that
imagining the world through the eyes of the law, or seeing
things in terms of what is true from the standpoint of law, could
have ideological effects on human beings. It tends to push their
imaginations in one direction rather than in another. It opens up
some possibilities for thinking while foreclosing others. This
power over the imagination is the power of ideology.
15
 Shaping
people’s imaginations and understandings of who they are and
what they are doing is one of the most important forms of power
that law possesses.
One might think that the problem with law's power is that it
compromises one's ability to understand what is true, because
what is true from the standpoint of law is not really true.
Therefore, when one sees things as law sees them, one is
deluded or one’s perception is distorted in some way.  But it is
important not to try to reduce all of law's ideological effects to
distortion or misrepresentation.
16
 The way law imagines sex
discrimination may not be the most just or reasonable way to
think about the problem. But that does not mean that the only
work that law performs is to distort or falsify the social world.
Rather, law adds something to the social world: legally created
categories and institutions that have consequences for how
people think and behave.  What law brings to the world is the
way that world looks to law.
The statutory scheme that allows employers to create 401(k)
plans adds something to the world; it does not simply distort or
mischaracterize it. The creation of a 401(k) plan obviously
shapes economic incentives and some economists might even
say it distorts incentives to save.  But its effects do not stem
merely from a false representation of the world.  Rather, the
statutory scheme is helping to make things in the world. Law
creates new concepts, distinctions, entities and institutions that,
in turn, create the possibility of new truths and new falsehoods.
Law makes it possible for certain propositions to be true or false
that could not have been true or false before, such as, “Mary
contributed to her 401(k) account” or “John made an
unwelcome advance to Mary and is a sexual harasser.”
14. See id. at 273-76.
15. Id. at 5-6, 126-29, 280, 282.
16. See id. at 214-15 (discussing ideological effects of narrative construction).
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One can certainly complain that sex discrimination law
misdescribes the problems of equality in the United States, but
it does more than simply misrepresent the problem of equality.
Sex discrimination law shapes the terms under which people
understand there to be a problem of equality or not. It creates
new categories of defining and describing behavior. It creates
new opportunities to treat people equally and unequally. It
supplements and equips the social world as well as distorting or
misrepresenting it. Law exercises its power over people by
creating reality and proliferating truth, not simply by
misrepresenting reality and distorting truth.
 What law does, and can do, is proliferate ideas, concepts,
institutions and forms of social imagination, which can attach
themselves to, reorganize, and even displace existing forms of
social understanding, social practice, and social reality. Law has
the opportunity to do this because of its status as law, because it
is intertwined with, supports and is supported by the power and
authority of the state. Because law is law, it matters what things
look like to law and how law characterizes them.
 This brings me to the third reason why the proliferation of
legal truth is important. It should be obvious from the
expressions “truth in the eyes of the law” or “true from a legal
perspective” that the kind of truth and reality that law creates is
not the only sort of truth, or knowledge, or reality that people
care about or think important.   There are many other forms of
knowledge acquisition in the world, and many other
conventions through which and purposes for which people try to
determine what is true or false, try to gather and assess
knowledge.  Examples include medicine, psychiatry,
psychology, and natural science, as well as social science,
history, and religion.
These other forms of life also produce knowledge, and things
that are true and false from their standpoint.  Legal knowledge
can come into conflict with these other forms of knowledge.
One might ask:  how is it possible that things can both be true
and yet come into conflict? The answer is that things that are
true from the standpoint of one set of social practices or social
conventions are not necessarily true from the standpoint of
another. The practices may be looking at very different things
and they may be asking very different sorts of questions. The
reason why law can come into conflict with other forms of truth
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and other forms of knowledge is that truth and knowledge are
shaped by institutional purposes. Legal knowledge exists to
regulate and declare what is legal or not legal.  Medical
knowledge exists for other purposes. Therefore, it is possible for
something to be judged true from the standpoint of law and not
be judged true from the standpoint of medical knowledge. That
is because legal judgments of truth and falsity are designed to
mesh with legal institutions and legal categories of judgment. A
legal test such as “beyond a reasonable doubt” or “supported by
substantial evidence in the record” need not correspond to the
standards or judgments of any other profession. If the legal test
is met, however, then the legal result is true from the standpoint
of law.
A similar conflict may occur between legal and historical
judgments about truth. Historians have a certain set of
professional conventions about good and bad historical writing
and good and bad argument. But these concerns may be at cross
purposes with the interests of lawyers who are interested in
invoking history and historical studies for the purposes of legal
argument. Historians may want to complexify; lawyers may
want to simplify. Historians may want to find truth in multiple
trends and perspectives; lawyers may want a relatively
straightforward answer that can be invoked to solve a legal
question. Historians may resist anachronism and imaginative
abstraction; lawyers may embrace both of these things.
Furthermore, because the legal system tends to look at things
from the standpoint of law and its purposes and interests, the
world may simply appear very different to law than to another
field of knowledge creation, such as medicine. My favorite
example is a patient who walks into an emergency room. From
the standpoint of medical knowledge the patient is a set of
clinical problems to be tested, identified, diagnosed and cured.
From the standpoint of legal knowledge the patient is a potential
tort suit. The practices of medical knowledge are devoted to
asking what sort of disease or condition the patient has, then
recognizing, classifying, treating and curing it. The practices of
legal knowledge are devoted to asking how the rights of the
patient, the doctor, the hospital, and the insurance company are
affected by what these actors do or fail to do.  Both practices
may produce true statements, but these true statements may
have no obvious connection to each other and they may even be
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in conflict. It is important to understand that the conflict
between the truths of law and medicine, when it occurs, does
not violate the laws of logic. It is not a logical contradiction but
a clash of institutions and purposes.
Even though these forms of knowledge have distinct goals
and purposes, they may nevertheless interact in important ways.
The way that medicine is practiced and the types of medical
knowledge that are gathered and ascertained may be shaped by
the possibility that the patient is a potential tort plaintiff, that the
patient has insurance or does not have insurance, and so on. In
this way law does more than simply describe the world. It not
only colonizes the mind; it can also colonize other forms of
knowledge. In this way law’s truth, or what is true in the eyes of
the law, can reshape and redirect (some would even say distort)
the gathering and collection of medical knowledge, and the
methods and devices through which medical truth is
ascertained, promulgated, and articulated.
17
In this essay I have taken a strongly positivist line.  I have
argued that legal conventions create, inform, and support
judgments of legal truth. But I have not viewed this as grounds
for praise. A person can be found guilty even if they did not
commit the act they were charged with; money can be political
speech according to judicial doctrine even if it displaces
democracy and drowns deliberation; people can be viewed as
equal in the eyes of the law even if their circumstances are so
divergent that the claim of law’s evenhandedness makes a
mockery of equality and a travesty of neutrality. Legal claims
can be true in the eyes of the law even if they are not true in the
eyes of the morally sensitive layperson or lawyer—even if they
distort and deform social relations, even if they debauch moral
thinking and mutilate human life.
The point of my approach is not to deny the truths that law
produces but to face them squarely, acknowledge them as real
things with real consequences for human life. I take a strongly
positivist or conventionalist line in this essay because it is
important to understand the proliferation of legal truth, and the
proliferation of its power, not as mere defects or imperfections
17. To be sure, this colonization is a two way street, for medical knowledge can (and
does) affect the developing forms of legal argument and legal practice. A contemporary
example is how the legal concepts of innocence and finality of legal proceedings are
affected by the discourse of genetics.
The Proliferation of Legal Truth 111
extraneous to law but as central features of what law is and what
law does. H.L.A. Hart once pointed out that whatever
positivism’s faults as a theory of law, it has the distinct virtue of
permitting a healthy degree of skepticism about the justice and
morality of existing legal systems.
18
 It does not sugarcoat law or
bestow it with greater moral legitimacy than it deserves.
Conventionalism—for legal positivism is but one form of
conventionalism—gives us a perspective against which we can
criticize law, acknowledge its defects, identify its forces and
name its harms.
That is not the only way one could think about law. One
might insist that an aspiration for justice and goodness is to be
found within the concept of law itself, and that law must
continually draw on the best parts of itself to work itself pure.
But to speak in this way tends to downplay the force of legal
truth, the imbrication of law’s power in social life and in the
human imagination. Law’s construction of a social world and its
development of the social imagination can do enormous good.
But it always also has other effects. It always also serves other
ends, including the empowerment of legal institutions and legal
forms of thinking.
Indeed, it is precisely law’s normative force—the felt sense
that law aspires to articulate and realize important human
values—that gives it such power to structure the moral
imagination, so that moral and political questions become
transformed into questions of law and legal interpretation. Law
and legal concepts can and do become part of utopian
imagination about the direction and production of a better
world. Yet if people articulate their political and moral ideals
through legal concepts and in legal terms, they are not escaping
the proliferation of legal truth. They are contributing to its
spread.
Thus, my point is not simply the familiar one associated with
positivism—that the law need not be just or moral to have the
status of law. Rather, my point is to focus on the ways in which
legal concepts, legal thinking, and legal imagination colonize
moral and ethical imagination. To do this, we must pay careful
attention to the many ways in which law and morality are not
18. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 597-99 (1958).
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separated, the many ways in which the moral imagination
becomes ensnared by and held in servitude to the legal.  Then the
truth of law does not necessarily set us free.
In this essay I have also emphasized how legal conventions
can fix what is true or false from the eyes of the law. But it
should be obvious that legal conventions are not always fixed,
uncontroversial, complete, or adequately specified in many
situations. Even so, the force of my argument is not vitiated
when we take legal indeterminacy into account. For law to
shape our cultural software and exercise its power over our
social imaginations, it is not necessary that everyone agree
which propositions of law are true and which are false, or hold
that legal conventions fully and uncontroversially specify the
application of legal norms in every situation. It is only
necessary that legal concepts and institutions shape the ways
that people apprehend, understand, reason, and argue about their
social world, and hence shape the contours and delineate the
boundaries of their disagreements. Even if people argue about
whether a display of pornography in the workplace can
constitute a hostile environment, they are still arguing in terms
of the legal concept of hostile environments. Even if people are
uncertain whether a particular restructuring of a business
transaction makes a certain tax deduction available to a
corporation, their uncertainty is offered against the background
of legally created institutions and concepts. And even if one is a
constitutional protestant
19
 and denies that the United States
Supreme Court has a monopoly on the meaning of the
Constitution, one is still imagining political ideals in terms of
the Constitution’s language, conceptions and institutions.
Thus, the proliferation of legal truth exists easily alongside
legal disagreement and legal dissensus. Legal truth persists
through historical changes in legal conventions and legal
structures. Legal indeterminacy does not attenuate law’s
conquest of the imagination. If anything, it may enhance it, by
encouraging discussion about the meaning of laws and about the
right answers to legal questions. Legal indeterminacy can
actually proliferate law's power by spurring people to think,
talk, contest, and argue using legal frameworks, legal concepts,
19. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-30, 37-50 (1988). A
protestant approach to the Constitution looks to “the legitimacy of individualized (or at
least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation.” Id. at 29.
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and legal terms.
Law’s power grows organically and relentlessly out of law’s
colonization of social imagination. Legal power is ramified and
spread through its ability to make things real and to make things
true. Law and legal conceptions become interwoven in the
fabric of everyday life, and in the cultural software that
members of a community employ to understand their practical
situation. In this way law becomes an inseparable element of the
techniques of socialization, with all of their internalized force.
Law is at its most powerful when it is most cultural, when it is
most invisible, when it is most seamlessly integrated into
practical and moral reasoning. Law is most powerful when we
see the world through its eyes, when its understanding becomes
part of our understanding, and when its truth becomes part of
our truth.
